Abstract. A key recovery attack on the stream cipher Achterbahn-128/80, a cipher in the second phase of eSTREAM, is given. The key observation is a high dependency between some input bits to the Boolean combining function generating the keystream. It results in the first known attacks on both the 128-bit and the 80-bit variants of the cipher. The amount of keystream bits required in the attacks is less than 2 64 , the maximum frame length.
Introduction
Achterbahn-128/80 is one of many stream ciphers submitted to the eSTREAM [1] stream cipher project. The first two versions of Achterbahn, referred to as version 1 and version 2, have been cryptanalyzed in [2] and [3] . Due to these observations, the cipher has been tweaked to resist the attacks and the current version is the third, referred to as Achterbahn-128/80. All Achterbahn ciphers are designed to be small and efficient in hardware. For each new version of the cipher, the amount of internal state has been increased in order to allow the combining function to have higher resiliency. This has been necessary to resist the attacks on the previous versions. However, Achterbahn-128/80 is still rather small in hardware and it is also one of the simplest ciphers in the eSTREAM project. This makes it still an interesting cipher and it was one of the selected ciphers to enter the second phase of eSTREAM, see [1] . A small drawback of Achterbahn-128/80 is that the frame length is limited to 2 64 bits. This has also been done in a few other ciphers in the eSTREAM project, but an important difference is that the limitation in Achterbahn-128/80 is necessary to prevent otherwise existing attacks.
In this paper we show that even if the frame length is limited to 2 64 bits, it is still possible to recover the key with complexity less than exhaustive key search. This applies to both the 80-bit and the 128-bit variant of the cipher. The attack is inspired by the attack on Achterbahn Version 2, but uses an important observation of a dependency between input bits to the Boolean function. This shows that it is possible to mount strong attacks also on Achterbahn-128/80. More specifically, the key for the 80-bit variant can be recovered using 2 58.24 keystream bits and computational complexity 2 72.90 . For the 128-bit variant we need 2 63.81 keystream bits and computational complexity 2 96.52 . The attack also allows for a tradeoff between the amount of known keystream and the computational complexity. The paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 will give a description of the Achterbahn family of stream ciphers. In Section 3 we will give a general theoretical analysis of Achterbahn and also briefly mention some of the previous attacks. In Section 4 the dependency between input variables appearing in the Achterbahn Boolean function, the key observation, will be discussed. In Section 5 and Section 6 we apply the attack to Achterbahn-80 and Achterbahn-128 respectively and recover a subset of the state bits. In Section 7 we show how the full key can be recovered and the paper is concluded in Section 8.
Description of Achterbahn
In this section we go through the design of the different versions of the Achterbahn stream cipher. Achterbahn Version 1 and Achterbahn Version 2 are briefly described in order to highlight the differences between the versions. Achterbahn-128/80 is described in more detail since this paper will focus on the attacks on that version.
The design principle behind all versions of Achterbahn is the same. The ciphers are based on the classical nonlinear combiner [4] . In a nonlinear combiner, the output of several linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs) are combined with a nonlinear Boolean function to form the output. The security, or insecurity, of this construction is quite well understood by now, see e.g., [5] and the references in that paper. Many attacks on nonlinear combiners use the fact that the registers have linear feedback. In order to protect against these attacks, the Achterbahn stream ciphers use nonlinear feedback shift registers (NLFSRs), see Fig. 1 . Before we take a closer look at the design, we introduce some notation that will be used in the rest of the paper. The number of shift registers used is denoted n, shift register i will be denoted by R i and the size of register i is denoted N i . All registers are primitive, which in this context means that the period of register R i is 2
Ni − 1. We denote this period by T i . Hence, The input bit to the Boolean function F (this is denoted differently in the different versions) from register R i at time t will be denoted x i (t) and if the time instance t is fixed the simplified notation x i will sometimes be used. The keystream z(t) will thus be given as
The Achterbahn stream cipher was first proposed in [6] and was submitted to the first phase of the eSTREAM project. 
having resiliency 4 and nonlinearity 64. After Achterbahn using this Boolean function was broken in [7] , the designers proposed to use a different combining function. Two new functions were proposed in [8] . But in [2] , which is the published version of [7] , it was shown that Achterbahn was insecure also in this case.
In [9] , Achterbahn Version 2 was proposed. It has 10 shift registers instead of 8 and uses a different Boolean combining function. This function, denoted S(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x 10 ) has resiliency 5 and nonlinearity 448. The sizes of the shift registers are N = 19, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31 and 32. Achterbahn Version 2 was shown to resist the attacks on the first version, but by considering a decimated version of the output sequence it was shown in [3] that this version could also be broken.
When Achterbahn was moved to the second phase of the eSTREAM project the design was changed one final time (no tweaks are allowed in the second phase of eSTREAM). The phase 2 version is called Achterbahn-128/80. The first two versions are based on a key size of 80 bits but the design of Achterbahn-128/80 makes it possible to use both 80 and 128 bit key. In the following, the two different variants will be denoted Achterbahn-80 and Achterbahn-128, respectively. Achterbahn-80, which is a substructure of Achterbahn-128, deploys 11 shift registers of all sizes between 22 and 32. The Boolean combining function, G(x 1 , . . . , x 11 ), is 6-resilient and has nonlinearity 896. Achterbahn-128 uses 13 shift registers. Registers R 1 to R 11 are the same as used in the 80-bit variant. Two extra registers, R 0 and R 12 , of size 21 and 33 respectively. are added. The Boolean combining function, F (x 0 , . . . , x 12 ), is 8-resilient and has nonlinearity 3584. Achterbahn-128 is downward compatible to Achterbahn-80 by just loading the registers R 0 and R 12 with all zeros. For the exact description of the combining functions we refer to [10] . The amount of keystream that is allowed to be generated for one key/IV pair has, by the designers, been limited to 2 64 bits. This is called the maximum frame length and applies to both the 80 bit and the 128 bit variants of Achterbahn-128/80. All attacks given in this paper will respect this limit and use less than 2 64 keystream bits. The first two versions of Achterbahn came in one full and one reduced variant. In the reduced variant the inputs to the Boolean combining function were taken simply as the value of the rightmost cell in Fig. 1 . In the full variant the input was a key dependent linear combination of a few shift register cells. In Achterbahn-128/80, the method used in the previous reduced variants has been adopted. The input to the Boolean function is just taken from a fixed shift register cell.
Initialization
The initialization of Achterbahn has been slightly changed in Achterbahn-128/80 compared to the previous two versions. Only the new initialization procedure will be explained here. Let k denote the key, |k| the key size in bits and k 0 . . . k |k|−1 be the individual bits in the key. Also, let IV denote the initialization vector and |IV | its size in bits. The initialization is divided into 6 steps and they are the following.
1. Each register R i is loaded in parallel with the first N i bits of the key, i.e., k 0 . . . k Ni−1 . 2. Each register R i is updated |k| − N i times, xoring the remaining |k| − N i key bits with the feedback bit to the register. 3. Each register R i is updated |IV | times, xoring the |IV | bits of the IV with the feedback bit to the register. 4. The output of the registers are compressed into one bit by the Boolean combining function and this bit is fed back and xored with the feedback bit to each register. This is done 32 times. 5. The least significant bit of each NLFSR is set to 1. This prevents the NLFSRs to be initialized with all zeros. 6. Warm up phase. The registers are clocked 64 times.
Because of step 5 above, the entropy of the content of register R i at the beginning of step 6 is only N i − 1. No unknowns (key bits) are used in phase 6 and thus, exhaustively searching register R i requires 2
Ni−1 tries.
Analysis of Achterbahn
This section will give a general analysis of the security of the Achterbahn stream cipher. The analysis is valid for any nonlinear combiner, regardless if the shift registers use linear or nonlinear feedback, though it will focus on the particular case of Achterbahn. The best attacks on the previous versions of Achterbahn are summarized in Section 3.3. The attacks on Achterbahn consists of two steps, namely 1. Recover the state of a subset of the NLFSRs. This step is equivalent to a distinguishing attack. 2. Recover the key. For Achterbahn, the complexity of this step is, for all known attacks, much smaller than the complexity of the first step.
Attacking the Achterbahn family of stream ciphers
One possible approach to attack Achterbahn has been focused on correlations between input and output bits in the Boolean combining function. Let the resiliency of the Boolean function be m. Then there is a linear relation between at least m + 1 input bits and the output bit that is unbalanced, i.e.,
for some subset A, of size |A| > m, of registers. Usually, is referred to as the bias or the imbalance and −1 ≤ ≤ 1. Finding a parity check equation for the sequence produced by i∈A x i (t) will result in a sum of keystream bits that is unbalanced. In [2] , it was shown how this parity check could be found and their method was generalized in [9] . It was noted that the sequence generated by R i has characteristic polynomial 1 − x Ti . More generally, the sequence produced by
The characteristic polynomial will immediately give us a parity check equation that can be used in a distinguisher. Hence, the sum of the 2 |A| keystream bits determined by (1) will give us a biased sample. The distance between the first and the last keystream bit in each sample is i∈A T i , i.e., the largest exponent in (1) . The amount of samples needed to detect the bias will be in the order of
The resiliency of the Boolean combining function has increased for every new version of Achterbahn, since the attacks have showed that the resiliency has not been enough. If the resiliency m of the function increases, it is clear that the number of required samples increases since |A| > m. To compensate for this, one approach is to guess the state of one or several registers. This will automatically give one or several initial states and the attack is not just a distinguishing attack, it will give the attacker the possibility to recover the key. Guessing d registers will decrease the number of terms in the product (1) by d. The number of samples to detect the bias will now be in the order of
Another approach to compensate for high resiliency is to consider nonlinear approximations of the combining function. The characteristic polynomial of the sequence produced by x i x j is given as 1−x TiTj and the characteristic polynomial of the sequence produced by x i x j x k is 1 − x TiTj T k . Using a quadratic or cubic approximation will reduce the amount of keystream bits in each sample and thus reduce the amount of samples needed to detect the bias. On the other hand, the distance between the first and the last keystream bit in each sample will increase and give an upper limit on the degree of the nonlinear approximation.
A third approach to compensate for high resiliency, proposed in [3] , is to not consider samples given by consecutive keystream bits. Instead, to remove the dependency of the linear term x i in the approximation, we can jump forward T i steps every time we take a new sample. The contribution to the Boolean combining function from register R i will then be constant, though we do not know if this constant is 0 or 1. Taking every T th i sample will increase the amount of keystream needed in the attack but it will decrease the computational complexity since the state of register R i does not have to be guessed. The attack on Achterbahn Version 2 and also the attack on Achterbahn-128/80 given in this paper use a combination of all three approaches given above.
Estimates of Attack Complexities
Following the ideas above, assume that we know that the sum of some keystream bits is zero with probability α = 0.5(1 + ). Further, assume that we need to guess the content of some registers and that we take every T th i sample in order to remove the dependency of register R i . We know that if our guess is correct, the bias can be detected and if the guess is wrong, our samples will not have any bias and will thus be completely random. However, if several initial states are tested, some wrongly guessed states will still deviate significantly from random. This follows from the fact that the number of times our biased expression holds can be assumed to be normally distributed around the expected value. Thus, if many candidate states are tested, the amount of samples needed to determine the correct state will be slightly more than given by (2) and (3). The problem of determining the correct initial state can be viewed as a decoding problem. In order to reconstruct a codeword sent over a noisy binary symmetric channel with crossover probability α, at least
bits are needed, where h(α) is the binary entropy function evaluated at α and M is the number of codewords. In our case the number of codewords is the number of possible initial states, 2 Ni−1 for register i. The second important factor in the amount of keystream needed is the distance between the first and the last bit in the parity check equation used. If this distance is larger than 2 64 then it will not be possible to get any biased samples at all. The total amount of keystream that is needed is thus the sum of the width of the parity check equation and the amount of samples that is needed to determine the correct initial states of the guessed registers.
The computational complexity of the attack is the number of guessed initial states, M , times the amount of samples that we need to process for each guess.
Since every T th i
sample is taken, we will not know the sign of . This will double the error probability. However, it is not crucial for our attack that only the correct guess will report a detected bias. It is possible to have a few probable initial states and recover the corresponding key from each state and then decide which key is correct. This will not influence the attack complexity.
Previous Attacks on the Achterbahn Family of Stream Ciphers
With the general theory for attacking Achterbahn given in Section 3.1 in mind, we briefly summarize the most efficient attacks on Achterbahn Version 1 and Achterbahn Version 2. The best attack on Achterbahn Version 1 uses the linear approximation
which will hold with probability α = 0.5(1 + 0.5). Hence, the bias will be = 0.5. Using (1), we get a parity check equation with 32 terms and the amount of keystream bits needed in the distinguisher is 2 64 as given by (2) . Guessing the state of register R 1 will result in an attack requiring 2 32 keystream bits as given by (3) and computational complexity 2 32 2 N1 . In the cryptanalysis on Achterbahn Version 2 given in [3] , a combination of all three approaches mentioned in Section 3.1 was used. More precisely, the approximation Q(x 1 , . . . , x 10 ) = x 1 + x 2 + x 3 x 8 + x 4 x 6 was used. The initial state of register R 2 was guessed and every T th 1 sample was taken. Further, a precomputed table was used to speed up the search for the initial state of R 2 . The attack required about 2 59 bits of keystream and had computational complexity about 2 59 .
The Sum of Dependent Variables
All previous attacks on the different versions of Achterbahn have assumed that the keystream bits used from the parity check equations are independent. The most important observation in this paper is that this assumption is not true. Let the output of the Boolean function F i on n variables be a binary random variable X i for i = 1 . . . k. Further, let i = 2 Pr(X i = 0) − 1 be the imbalance, i.e., Pr(X i = 0) = 1 2 (1 + i ). The celebrated piling-up lemma can then be written as follows. Lemma 1. The imbalance of the sum X = X 1 ⊕X 2 ⊕. . .⊕X k of k independent binary random variables is given by
However, if there is a dependency between variables, it is possible to have inequality. In linear cryptanalysis, dependency between variables is often assumed to be small and the piling-up lemma is used.
In Achterbahn-80, if we consider a quadratic approximation of the form
This approximation has bias = 2 −5 (or = 0 but this case is not interesting here). The characteristic polynomial of the sequence produced by the quadratic terms gives a parity check equation involving 4 terms. Hence, the sequence given by
is also biased if we know the initial states of R a , R b and R c . In all previous papers dealing with this kind of approximations of the output function, it has been assumed that the dependency between keystream bits used in (4) and similar expressions has been very small and, according to the piling-up lemma, the bias of (4) is = (2 −5 ) 4 = 2 −20 . However, it is easy to see that the variables are quite dependent, e.g., for the first two terms, the variables x d and x e will always be the same. Instead of 4n = 44 variables, there is only 11+9+9+7 = 36 different variables used in (4) . We have computed the exact bias by exhaustively searching all 2 36 possibilities and found that it will not be 2 −20 but instead 2 −12 . This has a huge effect on the attack complexities. Instead of 2 40 samples we only need about 2 24 samples to detect this bias. Looking at cubic approximations of Achterbahn-128 of the form
this will hold with bias = 2 −6 (or = 0). The sequence generated by the nonlinear terms will have a parity check equation given by
Assuming independent variables, the total bias will be (2 −6 ) 4 = 2 −24 . However, the real bias is also in this case 2 −12 because of the dependency between variables. For quadratic approximations of Achterbahn-128 the corresponding bias is 2 −12 , the same as for the 80-bit variant, instead of the previously assumed 2 −20 .
Attack on Achterbahn-80
The Boolean combining function used in Achterbahn-80 has resiliency 6 so every biased approximation must consider at least 7 variables. In this section, the attack parameters for a successful attack on Achterbahn-80 will be given.
Generalization of the Attack Using Quadratic Approximations
The form of the quadratic approximations we used in the attack on Achterbahn-80 is
where all indices are distinct. Assume that, in the attack, the initial states of registers R a and R b are guessed, i.e., we perform an exhaustive search over all possible initial states of these two registers. Further, every T th c sample is taken. The total amount of keystream needed is then
The computational complexity of the attack is given as
For all approximations of the form (5) that we use, we have α = 0.5(1 ± 2 −12 ).
Attack complexities for Achterbahn-80
We search through all approximations of the form (5). Table 1 shows the amount of keystream needed and the corresponding time complexity of an attack using a certain approximation. The best time complexity, 2 72.90 , is achieved if 2
58.24
keystream bits are available. Having less keystream bits results in higher complexity. We choose only to consider approximations resulting in lower computational complexity than 2 79 . 6 Attack on Achterbahn-128
The Boolean combining function used in Achterbahn-128 has resiliency 8 so every biased approximation must consider at least 9 variables. In this section we give the attacks on Achterbahn-128 using quadratic and cubic approximations.
Generalization of the Attack Using Quadratic Approximations
The quadratic approximation used in cryptanalysis of Achterbahn-128 can be written as
Exhaustively searching registers R a , R b , R c and R d and taking every T th e sample will result in an attack requiring
keystream bits and the computational complexity is
with α = 0.5(1 ± 2 −12 ).
Generalization of the Attack Using Cubic Approximations
For Achterbahn-128 it is possible, not only to look at quadratic approximations, but also to consider cubic approximations. The cubic approximations in our attack will have the form
It is not possible to find a product of the periods of 3 registers in Achterbahn-128 less than the maximum frame length, 2 64 . However, since periods of all registers are not relatively prime, it is possible to find 3 registers for which the least common multiple (lcm) of the periods is less than 2
64 . This will happen for lcm(T 0 , T 1 , T 3 ) = 2 62.60 , lcm(T 0 , T 1 , T 7 ) = 2 62.42 , lcm(T 0 , T 1 , T 12 ) = 2 62.19 and lcm(T 1 , T 3 , T 12 ) = 2 63.60 . Hence, for the attack to be successful the cubic term in the approximation must be one of x 0 x 1 x 3 , x 0 x 1 x 7 , x 0 x 1 x 12 and x 1 x 3 x 12 . In the attack, the registers R a , R b and R c are exhaustively searched and we take every T th d sample. The amount of keystream needed in the attack is
Attack complexities for Achterbahn-128
In Table 2 the attack complexities we have found for Achterbahn-128 is shown. The best computational complexity is achieved using the cubic approximations, but if less keystream is available, the quadratic approximations can be used as well. 
Recovering the Key
The figures given in Tables 1 and 2 are the complexities for recovering a subset of the states of the NLFSRs. This would be equivalent to a distinguishing attack on the cipher. In this section we show that the key also can be recovered and the complexity for this step is smaller than for the distinguishing attack. Thus, the figures in the tables are valid also for a key recovery attack. Because of the introduction of step 4 for in the initialization process, it is not possible to recover the key without knowing the state of all registers. In the attacks described in Section 5 and 6 we only recover a subset of the states. The output bit of each register is taken as a bit in the middle of the register and not the last bit. This makes the initialization process invertible and if we know all initial states it will be easy to recover the key. After recovering a subset of the states in the first step, it is possible, in a second step, to recover all other states with much less keystream and complexity than in the first step. As an example, when the approximation x 1 + x 2 + x 7 + x 3 x 10 + x 4 x 9 is used for Achterbahn-80, x 1 and x 2 are recovered in the first step. When these are known it is easy to recover x 7 by just guessing the state of this. In the next step we can use the linear approximation x 1 + x 2 + x 3 + x 4 + x 7 + x 9 + x 10 .
This approximation has bias 2 −3 and we can use a characteristic polynomial for two of the 4 unknown variables, decimate the sequence for one unknown and guess the last. Doing this for all 4 unknowns will give us in total 7 recovered registers. The last 4 can be found using other linear approximations. A similar method can be used to recover all states of Achterbahn-128.
When the initial states of all registers are recovered, they are clocked backwards until the beginning of step 3 in the initialization step. To make it simple, the last 80 − N 1 bits of the key are guessed. All registers are clocked backwards according to the guessed key bits until the beginning of step 2 of the initialization is reached. When the first N 1 bits of the states are the same for all registers, the correct key has been found. This last step has computational complexity 2 58 and is thus not a bottleneck. For the 128-bit variant we can use the time-memory tradeoff given in [3] and [2] in order to find the key. Then we need e.g., 2
40 in memory and 2 88 in computational complexity.
Conclusion
Achterbahn-128/80 is the version of the Achterbahn family that has been proposed for the second phase of the eSTREAM project. In previous papers it has been assumed that the bias of the sum of output bits from the Boolean combining function has been given by the piling-up lemma. In this paper we observed a strong dependency between the input bits to the Boolean combining function and this resulted in a bias much larger than previously assumed. This bias is high enough to mount similar attacks as proposed on Achterbahn Version 2 also on Achterbahn-80 and Achterbahn-128. The best attack on Achterbahn-80 and Achterbahn-128, recovering the full key, has computational complexity 2
72.90
and 2 96.52 respectively. The amount of keystream required in the attacks is less than 2 64 , the maximum frame length.
